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Abstract
We examine the welfare effects of forbidding price discrimination in inter-
mediate goods markets when firms can bargain over terms of their nonlinear
supply contracts. In particular, our focus is on secondary line injury to com-
petition under three interpretations of what it means to forbid price discrimi-
nation. We find that in each case, forbidding discriminatory discounts renders
retailer bargaining power useless in mitigating manufacturer market power. As
a result, all retailers end up paying higher input prices, and all retail prices
rise. We show by example that the welfare loss can be substantial.
We thank three anonymous referees and the editor for their helpful comments. The views
expressed herein are not purported to represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice. Please
address all correspondence to Greg Shaffer, Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, MI 48109-1220 or send electronic mail to Greg.ShafferOum.cc.umich.edu.
An oft encountered question in antitrust is whether externalities caused by particular business
practices harm competition or simply transfer rents. Nowhere are the issues more difficult than in
intermediate goods markets where buyers of a product subsequently compete in its resale. Because
downstream firms' demands are interdependent, each firm's profit depends not only on its own input
price, but also on those of its rivals. If some buyers can use their bargaining leverage to extract
discounts that rivals cannot secure, the rivals are disadvantaged and thereby injured. Injury to
competitors, however, is not the same thing as injury to competition, and it is not obvious that
competition is harmed in this case.
Nevertheless, in an effort to protect small business from alleged unfair purchasing practices
of larger rivals, and thereby to ensure "equal competitive opportunity," Congress enacted the
Robinson-Patman Act in 1936. It amends Section 2a of the original Clayton Act, and makes it
unlawful for a seller "to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality" where substantial injury to competition may result. As interpreted by the
courts, price discrimination has often been found to be illegal upon a mere showing of injury to
competitors. This interpretation has rightfully spawned an enormous amount of criticism when
applied to primary line cases (alleged injury to rivals of the seller offering the discriminatory price),
but surprisingly, there has been little criticism of its application to secondary line cases (alleged
injury to rivals of the buyer receiving the discriminatory price).1
Indeed, a common view is that society is best served by ensuring "equal competitive opportu-
'Primary line cases used to turn on showing injury to competitors from alleged predatory conduct by the defendant.
See Moss v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945), where the Court indicated that diversion
of business away from rivals in itself was sufficient to violate the statute. In another example, which Bowman (1967)
has called "the most anticompetitive antitrust decision of the decade" (Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386
U.S. 685 (1967)), the Supreme Court inferred injury to competition from evidence of a "drastically declining price
structure." Since then, the burden of proof on plaintiffs claiming predation has grown substantially. Recently, in
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown B Williamson Tobacco Corp. 113 U.S. 2578 (1993), the Supreme Court ruled that a
claim of primary line injury under Robinson-Patman is of the same general character as a predatory pricing claim
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, thus making it much tougher to win a primary line case.
1
nity" among downstream rivals. According to one proponent, who is now a federal judge,
Price discrimination impairs efficiency in the market in which the purchasers from the
discriminating seller sell, by creating competitive cost disparities unrelated to differences
in the relative efficiency of the competitors. The purchaser to whom the discriminating
seller sells at a lower price may be no more efficient than the competing seller who is
charged a higher price.
2
An alternative view, expressed by Bork (1978), is that the welfare effect of forbidding price
discrimination in secondary line cases is ambiguous at best. Borrowing from the literature on third
degree price discrimination in final goods markets, he notes that price discrimination generally
results in low (high) elasticity of demand buyers receiving a higher (lower) price than they would
receive under uniform linear pricing. He concludes that the overall effect on welfare is likely to be
positive if new markets are served at the lower price; otherwise, the change in welfare turns on the
concavity of demand curves.
However, Katz (1987) (who came "to exhume Robinson-Patman, not to praise it") correctly
points out that there are fundamental differences between final goods and intermediate goods
markets. One difference is that in intermediate goods markets buyers have interdependent demands.
Another is that buyers of intermediate goods can often integrate backward and supply the input
themselves. Building on these insights, Katz shows in a model with linear pricing that "Under
reasonable conditions, intermediate goods price discrimination leads to higher input prices being
charged to all buyers." The implication is that, ceteris paribus, Robinson-Patman may be socially
beneficial.
But intermediate goods markets differ from final goods markets in other ways as well, most
notably in the propensity of suppliers to bargain with downstream firms and use nonlinear pricing.
2
Posner (1976) at footnote 14.
The consequences of these practices for efficiency are substantially different under downstream
rivalry than they are under downstream monopoly. In the latter case, the seller and single buyer
each agree that the marginal payment should be chosen to induce the buyer to maximize joint
profits; bargaining occurs only over the fixed payment. Under rivalry, however, each buyer has an
incentive unilaterally to negotiate a lower marginal payment in an effort to gain a cost advantage
over its rivals. Obviously, a cost advantage gives the buyer higher profits in the resale market. But
since each buyer ignores the effect on its rivals' profits, it does not fully internalize the dissipation
in joint profits. Since lower marginal payments subsequently translate into lower retail prices,
consumers stand to gain, and on balance social welfare rises as well.
3 Intervening in this process
by forbidding intermediate product price discrimination can have adverse consequences.
To illustrate this idea, section II presents a model of a single manufacturer who negotiates
non-linear contracts with two retailers who subsequently compete in distribution. We solve for a
"benchmark" equilibrium for the case of no government intervention.
Section III examines how alternative interpretations of the government's ban on price discrimi-
nation affect equilibrium pricing. While the precise meaning of secondary line price discrimination
under Robinson-Patman is not given in the statute, the courts appear to have settled on the fol-
lowing. The Act is violated if 1) retailers are offered different payment schedules, or 2) retailers
are offered the same payment schedule, but the discounts received by some retailers are not "func-
tionally available" to all. Translating this interpretation into the implied restrictions on the set of
bargaining instruments available in the model allows us to solve for the 'Robinson-Patman' equi-
libria. Our main finding is that forbidding intermediate goods price discrimination leads to higher
marginal input prices for all buyers. In contrast to Katz, our model implies that, ceteris paribus,
3
The failure to maximize joint profits in this case is due to a form of contractual incompleteness. The problem is
that under bilateral bargaining, nonlinear contracts are insufficient to align incentives for bilateral opportunism with
the goal of maximizing joint profits. Doing so requires retailers' payments to depend on their own and their rivals'
actions (see O'Brien and Shaffer, 1992). There are many reasons why such contracts may not be feasible, ranging
from the costs of enforcement to illegality under the antitrust statutes.
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Robinson-Patman unambiguously reduces welfare. This finding is independent of both the degree
of asymmetry among the downstream firms as well as their idiosyncratic bargaining powers.
Section IV illustrates these results in a linear demand example, which shows that the welfare
loss caused by Robinson-Patman can be quite large. We also compare and contrast profits under
alternative regimes. Not everyone loses under Robinson-Patman; this may account for some of the
lobbying behavior observed when the Act was passed and whenever policy reforms are considered.
II Model
We consider an intermediate goods market in which a single manufacturer produces a product at
constant marginal cost c and sells it to two competing retailers for subsequent distribution to final
consumers. The upstream monopoly assumption is made partly for tractability and partly to rule
out apriori any primary line issues. In particular, we will not be concerned with issues of predatory
pricing, or whether price discrimination fosters cartel instability. Thus, our welfare conclusions
ignore these traditional concerns. The assumption of constant marginal cost dismisses any possible
Robinson-Patman defense on cost justification grounds.
4 
The restriction to two retailers is purely
for expositional convenience. Like the constant marginal cost assumption, it can be generalized
without altering any qualitative results.
Retailers are differentiated in the sense that although the product they sell is homogeneous,
customers have different store preferences. Let consumer demands for the products of retailers 1
and 2 be Di(Pi, P2 ), i = 1,2. We assume that demands are downward sloping, that the goods are
substitutes, and that a unit increase in both prices causes the demand for good i to fall.
We consider a three-stage model of pricing and distribution. In the initial stage, the manufac-
'One of the traditional criticisms of the Robinson-Patman Act is that discrimination under the law is not the same
thing as economic discrimination. In theory, the Act allows for price differentials "which make only due allowance
for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery." In practice, however, the cost justification defense is
generally recognised as a mirage. The inherent difficulty in determining economic costs and arbitrariness in allocating
them to individual products makes for a very difficult trial defense. This paper abstracts from these difficulties by
ruling out cost differences from the start.
turer publicly announces supply terms for each retailer. Unfortunately for the manufacturer, he
cannot commit to these terms in the absence of laws constraining his behavior. Thus, he may soon
(stage two) find himself entering into private, bilateral negotiations with each retailer, as described
in detail below. Stage one is actually redundant when negotiations are unconstrained in stage two,
but it becomes important when bilateral renegotiation is disallowed by Robinson-Patman. We have
in mind situations like what occurred in (U.S. v. Borden Company, 370 U.S. 460 (1962)), where
suppliers of fluid milk used private letters to offer varying discounts to certain chain stores and
independents.' Such discounts may be offered unilaterally by the manufacturer, or they may arise
from bargaining pressure exerted by downstream firms.
Once contract terms are agreed upon, the retailers engage in Bertrand competition (stage three)
to establish final goods prices. A key assumption is that the ith retailer's negotiated contract is
private information between the manufacturer and retailer i. This assumption is natural when con-
tracts are determined through bilateral bargaining, since firms would adhere to publicly announced
first stage contracts only if it were in their bilateral interest to do so. An implication is that a
(secret) adjustment in one buyer's marginal payment does not affect its rival's final goods pricing
behavior. Thus, when the manufacturer and retailer i adjust only their contract, they take as given
the retail price the rival plans to set.
We capture the essence of both fixed and marginal payments by assuming that retailer i's
payment to the manufacturer is
0 ifDi,=0,
F+w;D1  if Di;>0,
where w; is the marginal payment (wholesale price) and F, is the fixed payment. The fixed payment
can be either a fixed fee (if positive) or a discriminatory slotting allowance (if negative). Let
the manufacturer's profit be WM = js(w; - c)D.(PI, F) + F, and let retailer i's profit be
'See Breit and Elzinga (1989), p. 363.
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xi = (Pi - w;)D(Pi,P2) - F. We assume that if an equilibrium to the Bertrand pricing game
exists in which both retailers are active, that equilibrium is unique.
6
11.1 Solving the model in the absence of government intervention.
"When a degree of non-transferability...sufficient to make [price] discrimination prof-
itable is present, the relation between the monopolistic seller and each buyer is, strictly,
one of bilateral monopoly. The terms of the contract that will emerge between them is,
therefore,...subject to the play of that 'bargaining'..." (A.C. Pigou, 1932, 278).
Turning to the details of the contracting process, we assume that when Robinson-Patman is
not enforced, the manufacturer bargains simultaneously with each retailer in stage two. A variety
of assumptions have been made in the literature about the details of bargaining in vertical control
models like ours. The most common assumption is that the manufacturer has all the bargaining
power, and offers take-it or leave-it two-part tariffs that are observed by both retailers before
choosing final prices (i.e., stage two would be the same as stage one in our set-up). Under this
assumption it is well known that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium yields a wholesale price
vector wI that induces retailers to charge the vertically integrated retail price vector P
1
, and fixed
fees that collect retailers' surplus.
7 A difficulty with using this approach to examine the effects of
Robinson-Patman, however, is that it ignores incentives the manufacturer and each retailer may
have to renegotiate privately.
We desire an equilibrium concept incorporating the idea that equilibrium contracts should be
robust against private renegotiation by firms who contract with each other, at least in situations
when bilateral renegotiation is legal. A fairly general way to capture this idea is to define a bargain-
ing equilibrium as a set of contracts, and Bertrand final goods prices induced by those contracts,
'It suffices to assume that retailer i's profit under two-part tariffs is concave in P. and obeys the dominant diagonal
condition |8
2
, /8Pi> ,E 18
2
/8P.8P31.'See Dixit (1983) and Mathewson and Winter (1984).
that simultaneously solve asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions between the manufacturer and
each retailer.
8 
To ensure that each Nash bargaining problem is well defined under our assumption
that contracts are private information, we assume that the manufacturer and each retailer bargain
taking the rival retailer's contract and retail price as given.
9 
We will be more precise about how
this concept embodies the idea of robustness against private renegotiation as we proceed. We will
also discuss its foundations from noncooperative bargaining theory in subsection 11.2 below.
The Nash bargaining problem of the manufacturer and retailer i is described by their disagree-
ment points, (dMu,0), and by the convex set of payoff pairs, f2; = {(M, ;)IIru - dm, r; > 0). We
assume the disagreement point dM, corresponds to the profit the manufacturer expects to earn if
negotiations with retailer i break down. In this event, the manufacturer and rival retailer negotiate
as bilateral monopolists according to their respective bargaining strengths.
10
A set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions is a vector of wholesale prices and fixed fees that
maximize the Nash products 4i = (rM - dmj)*(r;)(1-ad, i = 1,2, where as E (0,1) is a measure of
the manufacturer's bargaining power in negotiations with retailer i. Differentiating 4; with respect
to F; gives the pair of first order conditions
-- , = agxi- (1 -a;)(ru- dus)= 0, i =1, 2. (1)
8F;
'The phrase "bargaining equilibrium" is due to Harsanyi (1977), who considers the general problem of simultaneous
bargaining by two-player coalitions in N-player bargaining games. Our definition is actually closer to that of Horn
and Wolinsky (1988), who examined incentives for horizontal mergers by upstream and downstream firms when input
prices are negotiated. The main difference between our definition and theirs is that they considered observable linear
contracts, whereas we consider non-linear contracts that are private information.
'We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the need to clarify the assumptions defining the utility possibility
frontier in each bilateral bargaining problem.
"Under this assumption the Nash bargaining solution between the manufacturer and each retailer corresponds
to the equilibrium of an alternating offer non-cooperative bargaining game in which firms are motivated to reach
agreement by fears that negotiations may break down. Our qualitative results hold equally well when the disagreement
point corresponds to the profit stream the manufacturer earns from firm j while in a state of disagreement with firm
i. See Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) for the theoretical connection between non-cooperative bargaining
and these two interpretations of the disagreement point in the Nash bargaining solution. The assumption in the text
is made only to simplify computations in deriving explicit solutions to the model.
6
Differentiating O; with respect to w;, using (1), and simplifying, gives the first order conditions
8D- 8D.
D; (P;- c +(; -c) 0,i = 1,2, ji#i. (2)
Optimal retailer pricing requires
D, +(Pi- wi)- = 0 i =1,2.
8P, (3)
Conditions (1), (2), and (3) are necessary for (wiwa, Fl, F2, P1 , P2) to arise in a bargaining equi-
librium. Surprisingly, they yield the following strong prediction.
Proposition 1 When price discrimination is allowed, the bargaining equilibrium wholesale prices
equal the manufacturer's marginal cost. 11
Proof; Substituting equation (3) into (2), we see that setting wi = w2 = c satisfies (2). Thus,
wi = w2 = c is a solution to equations (2) and (3), and fixed fees can be chosen to satisfy (1). The
appendix shows that marginal cost pricing is the only solution to 1-3. Q.E.D.
This conclusion is independent of a, and holds for any amount of demand asymmetry. It is
driven by the assumption that negotiations are done in private. Intuitively, because retailer 2
cannot observe retailer l's actual supply terms, the manufacturer and retailer 1 know that an
adjustment in w1 will not affect either P2 or F2. Suppose W2 = c, so that the manufacturer extracts
a surplus of F2 from retailer 2. Then in negotiations with retailer 1, it is as if retailer 2 does not
exist. The manufacturer and retailer 1 simply act as if they are bilateral monopolists taking P2
as given. In this case, it is well known that the Nash bargaining solution reduces to a two step
procedure. The two parties first maximize joint surplus by choosing a marginal payment equal
to marginal cost (w1 = c), then they divide the surplus with a fixed fee determined according to
their individual bargaining strengths. Now suppose wI = c. Then by the same reasoning, the
"O'Brien and Shafer (1992) show that this result also holds under general non-linear contracts. What drives the
result is that private negotiations take place over both marginal and fixed components of the payment schedule.
manufacturer and retailer 2 perceive themselves as bilateral monopolists and choose W2 = c. Thus,
the set of contracts with w1 = wa = c and F1,F2 chosen to reflect bargaining strengths are mutual
(bilateral) best responses and therefore arise in a bargaining equilibrium.
12
Note that in addition to characterizing the bargaining equilibrium wholesale prices, equation
(2) is the first order condition for choosing a wholesale price wi to maximize the bilateral profits
rM - -i of the manufacturer and retailer i. Since wholesale prices equal marginal cost in any
bargaining equilibrium, it follows that if either wholesale price is different than marginal cost, the
manufacturer and at least one retailer can negotiate a different wholesale price that will increase
their joint surplus. This verifies our earlier assertion that the bargaining equilibrium concept
embodies the idea of robustness against private renegotiation.Ya
Despite their best efforts, neither retailer in this model gains a marginal cost advantage over its
rival in equilibrium." They both end up negotiating wholesale prices equal to production marginal
cost. This does not mean that the resulting retail prices are the same (since demands may be
asymmetric), nor does it mean that the average prices paid for the manufacturer's product are the
same. Each retailer's average price is determined by the quantity it buys in equilibrium and its
fixed fee. The fixed fee, in turn, depends inter alia on relative bargaining powers. Suppose, for
example, that retailer 2 is a large chain store and retailer 1 is a small independently owned concern.
"The intuition is precisely the same when downstream firms are Cournot competitors. Hart and Tirole (1990) and
McAfee and Schwartz (1993) show that marginal cost input pricing arises in that case as well.
"One might argue that the need to develop a reputation might prevent the upstream arm from engaging in this
type of opportunism. But reputation alone is not always enough, especially for young upstream firms. For example,
retailers may believe that the upstream firm will not be around long enough to reap the benefits of building a
reputation. Even for experienced firms, if downstream orders are infrequent, the short term gains from making
private offers may outweigh the value of building a reputation. Another problem arises if retailers have difficulty
distinguishing opportunism from exogenous fluctuations in market conditions. In this case a supplier may simply
be unable to build a reputation. Finally, it is clear that reputation does not work in every case from the complex
franchise contract law on disclosure and dealer termination."We have abstracted from several considerations that could give one buyer lower marginal prices. First, the
manufacturer may have a lower marginal cost of selling to one buyer than another. If so, then each buyer would
receive its good at the marginal cost of serving it. Second, retailers may differ in their degrees of risk aversion. For
example, a retailer that is more risk averse may negotiate a lower fixed payment in exchange for a higher wholesale
price. Third, some buyers may be compensated at the margin for performing tasks that are traditionally reserved
for wholesalers. We leave these extensions for future research, but note here that as long as the engendered cost
advantage is small enough, our qualitative results will continue to hold.
8
Then there are two factors that may tend to give the chain a lower average price. First, because of
its size, the large chain can spread its fixed cost over a greater quantity than can its smaller rival.
Second, the chain store is likely to have more bargaining power than the smaller store and hence
may be able to negotiate a lower fixed fee.s
Notice that since ws = wa = c, bargaining equilibrium retail prices are the same as would
be chosen by vertically integrated duopolists who each produce at marginal cost c. These prices
generally fall well short of joint profit maximizing levels.'
6 
The bargaining equilibrium outcome
is about as competitive as one could hope for. Proposition 1 implies that retail monopsony power
suffices to block completely market power at the manufacturing stage from being passed on to
consumers.
11.2 Noncooperative foundations of bargaining equilibria.
We close this section by briefly describing two noncooperative games that yield bargaining equilibria
as solutions.'
7 
Consider first the simple bargaining game in which a single upstream firm makes
private take-it or leave-it offers to multiple retailers who then compete by simultaneously choosing
retail prices. As pointed out by several authors,'
8 
this game and its Cournot variant have multiple
perfect Bayesian equilibria owing to the arbitrary nature of retailers' out-of-equilibrium beliefs
about offers received by their rivals. Two approaches have been suggested to deal with this problem.
One approach is to require equilibria to be immune not only from profitable deviations by individual
"in general, the size of the discount a retailer can negotiate is increasing in its threat point, the inverse of its
discount rate, and its cost of making bargaining concessions. Thus, a chain store may obtain a lower average price
than a smaller independent store because it has better alternatives in the event negotiations break down, it has a
higher discount rate, or it is more costly for it to accept a higher price.
"'6oint profit maximization requires wholesale prices in excess of marginal cost in order to induce retailers to
internalize the effects of their rivalry."This exercise is in the spirit of what has become known as "the Nash program," which refers to the idea whose
origins can be traced to Nash (1953) that the choice of axioms in cooperative approaches to the bargaining problem
should be guided by noncooperative games that explicitly model players' bargaining moves. Binmore (1985) has
suggested that, "operationally, this means that cooperative solution concepts need to be firmly rooted in noncooper-
ative theory in the sense that the concept should be realizable as the solution of at least one interesting and relevant
noncooperative bargaining game (and preferably of many such bargaining games).""See Hart and Tirole (1990), O'Brien and Shaffer (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1993).
players, but also from profitable contractual deviations by coalitions of players who contract with
each other. Such equilibria were called "contract equilibria" by Cremer and Riordan (1987) in a
somewhat different context.19 O'Brien and Shaffer (1992) showed that a bargaining equilibrium is
a contract equilibrium with a particular distribution of rents determined by a,, i = 1,2.
An alternative approach to the multiplicity problem is to place restrictions on retailers' out-
of-equilibrium beliefs. The "market-by-market bargaining" restriction of Hart and Tirole (1990)
and the "passive beliefs" restriction of McAfee and Schwartz (1993) require that retailers view
unexpected offers by the manufacturer as unilateral deviations. Under this restriction, the unique
perfect Bayesian equilibrium to the take-it or leave-it game yields a bargaining equilibrium in which
the manufacturer receives all the rents. Intuitively, unilateral deviation beliefs force equilibria to
be immune from profitable bilateral deviations by the manufacturer and each retailer.2 0
The take-it or leave-it game can be generalized to an infinite horizon bargaining game in which
the manufacturer and each retailer alternate offers each period until reaching agreement or until
negotiations break down. Briefly, suppose the manufacturer makes private offers to both retailers
"A related idea is the "strong equilibrium" concept of Aumann (1959), which requires immunity from profitable
deviations by any coalition of players. Weakening this to allow deviations only by individuals and coalitions of firms
that contract with each other yields a contract equilibrium in our model.
"One might think that the manufacturer's offer to retailer i might signal the offer (or set of reasonable offers) it
has made to retailer j. If so, this could reduce the set of "reasonable" equilibria. Unfortunately, the refinements in
the literature that deal with the signalling problem under imperfect information (e.g., the "intuitive criterion" and
others implied by "strategic stability" (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986)), have little power in our model, even in the
take-it or leave-it framework. The difficulty can be seen by observing that Kohlberg and Mertens' "never a weak best
response" (NWBR) criterion for pruning inferior strategies with the hope of eliminating equilibria that are not part
of stable sets does not prune many strategies at all in our model. For example, one type of equilibrium to the take-it
or leave-it game has the manufacturer offer the wholesale price vector w that induces retailers to set the vertically
integrated price vector PI, and a fixed fee vector FI that collects both retailers' surplus. This equilibrium can be
supported by each retailer's strategy of charging P' whenever offered the contract it expects and rejecting any other
offer. The NWBR formulation of stability states that an equilibrium outcome must remain an equilibrium outcome
when a strategy is deleted which is inferior (i.e., not a best reply) at every equilibrium with that outcome. Now if it
were true that all offers to retailer j other than uo were inferior at every equilibrium with the vertically Integrated
outcome, then one could eliminate those strategies and show that the manufacturer could gain by deviating, since in
the new game retailer i would then effectively have unilateral deviation beliefs. However, there are equilibria that
yield the vertically integrated outcome in which offering 'sb 9 Ej is a weak best reply for the manufacturer to the
retailers' equilibrium strategies. In one of these equilibria, retailer i rejects any offer that does not include w; and
charges P' if it receives the offer it expects; retailer j rejects any offer that does not include uj or dj and charges
Pi when offered either wj or sb, along with a fixed fee that it expects will extract all its surplus. Similar arguments
make it clear that stability does not significantly reduce the set of equilibria in this game.
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in period 1 that the retailers simultaneously accept or reject. Each retailer who accepts its offer
chooses a retail price. Each retailer who rejects its offer faces a small exogenous probability that its
negotiations may break down before it can make a counteroffer. In that event any retailer who has
reached agreement learns of it and renegotiates with the manufacturer by alternating offers as in
Rubinstein (1982). If its negotiations do not break down, each retailer who rejects the offer comes
back in period 2 with a counter offer (the offers are simultaneous if both retailers remain unsigned),
which the manufacturer accepts or rejects. Retailers whose offers are accepted then choose retail
prices. Bargaining continues in this way, with the manufacturer making offers to unsigned retailers
in each odd period, with unsigned retailers making counteroffers to the manufacturer in each even
period, and with a small exogenous probability that each retailer's negotiations may break down
between periods, until both retailers have reached agreement or negotiations have broken down,
at which time final sales are made. It can be shown that under the unilateral deviation beliefs
restriction, this game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which wholesale prices equal
marginal cost and the equilibrium division of rents depends on firms' relative levels of impatience.'
Different levels of impatience translate into different values of o,, i = 1,2, in the Nash bargaining
approach we have adopted. The analysis of this game is similar to that of Jun (1989), who ex-
amines a similar alternating offer bargaining model of negotiations between an employer and two
unions. The main difference is that Jun finds a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, whereas with
unobservable nonlinear contracts, we require unilateral deviations beliefs to establish uniqueness.
III Forbidding Price Discrimination
A secondary line violation of the Robinson-Patman Act is established if there is a reasonable
possibility that the seller's discriminatory prices may injure competition. Historically, the Supreme
"
1
As when the manufacturer makes take-it or leave-it offers, unilateral deviations beliefs have the effect of forcing
equilibria to be immune from profitable bilateral renegotiation. This yields wholesale prices equal to marginal cost,
leaving only fixed fees to be determined by firms' levels of impatience in bargaining.
Court has inferred the requisite injury to competition from price differentials sufficient in amount
to influence resale prices or impair profits."
Translated into our model, we interpret the Supreme Court as requiring the marginal payment,
i.e., the wholesale price, to be the same for both retailers. This requirement is independent of
whether a firm receiving a lower wholesale price passes some of it through to consumers via a
lower retail price. Obviously, any pass-through creates a retail price wedge over and above what
would exist in the absence of any discrimination, and the firm paying the higher wholesale price
has grounds to sue by virtue of the link between the additional wedge and its resulting loss in sales.
But even if the favored retailer does not lower its retail price, the firm paying the higher wholesale
price can still sue on the grounds that its profit was impaired relative to its rival. 23
By the same reasoning, we interpret the Supreme Court as requiring any fixed payment to be
the same for both retailers. However, whether or not fixed payments are even allowed depends
on how the courts interpret a fixed payment schedule that is the same for all downstream buyers
regardless of their size. The law is somewhat ambiguous regarding instances in which by virtue of
the same fixed payment, a large retailer in effect receives a lower average price than a small retailer.
But it appears that a finding of injury turns on the degree of asymmetry between buyers. If a lower
average price were judged "functionally available" to all, then the manufacturer's payment schedule
would not be deemed to have caused injury. On the other hand, if the lower average price were not
"functionally available" to all, then the requisite injury would be found."
22See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, (1948). In the Supreme Court's most recent statement on secondary
line injury, Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 (1983), it reaffirmed that an inference of
injury can only be overcome by "evidence breaking the causal connection between a price differential and lost sales
or profits."
"See Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F. 2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965). According
to the most recent ABA monograph on the Robinson-Patman Act (1980), the inference of injury rule "applies even
if resale prices between favored and unfavored purchasers remain the same, since the latter may still be injured by
impairment of their profits or their ability to provide services.'
"4For instance, one of the reasons the Court found against Morton Salt, was that "theoretically, these discounts
are equally available to all, but functionally they are not," 334 U.S. 37, 42-43. According to Rowe (1962 p. 97,98),
"no price discrimination arises if the same concessions are practically accessible to all customers" (he cites National
Lead Co., 49 FTC 791, (1953) and Unites States Rubber Co., 28 FTC 1498, (1939)).
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Based on this interpretation, we consider two cases. In the first case, the manufacturer must
charge a common wholesale price and cannot specify a fixed fee. In the second case, the manu-
facturer is allowed to charge a common fixed fee in addition to a common wholesale price. The
second case is permitted provided the degree of asymmetry among retailers is small enough. We
also consider a third case which practically may arise because of information constraints. In some
situations the courts may simply not be able to verify discriminatory fixed fees. Thus, in our
third case, although the manufacturer must charge a common wholesale price, the fixed fees are
determined through bargaining.
The timing in our model is the same as before. In the initial stage, the manufacturer publicly
announces its supply terms. However, these terms are now subject to legal restrictions. Bargaining,
if any, takes place in stage two, and retail prices are chosen in stage three. We assume that
bargaining can arise only in case three, i.e., only when the courts cannot verify discriminatory fixed
fees, and then only over the fixed payment. We do not allow bargaining over the wholesale price.
Our justification for this assumption is the clause in section 2f of the Robinson-Patman Act which
makes it illegal for a buyer "knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price." In other
words, retailers in our model refrain from renegotiating the wholesale price because if they were
successful, they would be held liable for inducing illegal price discrimination. The manufacturer
obviously prefers that there be no bargaining over the wholesale price and has every incentive to
remind retailers of their liability under section 2f.25
We begin by solving the retailers' pricing problem, the stage of the game that is common to
each of the three cases. Each retailer chooses its price P;, to maximize zr = (P; - w)Di(PIP2),
2t An alternative assumption, which we do not make, is that retailers can negotiate over the wholesale price,
cogsnisant of the fact that if anyone is successful in obtaining a discount, the lower wholesale price is then granted to
their rivals as well. The disadvantage of this alternative assumption is that it requires a more complete specification
of the bargaining process, and would at best only mitigate the welfare problem we identify, without altering our
qualitative conclusions. Intuitively, bargaining over the wholesale price loses much of its appeal to buyers who know
that they cannot gain a marginal cost advantage. Adding to this is the fact that the manufacturer will be more
reticent to grant wholesale price concessions precisely because he knows that they must be given to all buyers. Both
of these factors lead to a higher wholesale price when discrimination is forbidden than when it is allowed.
i = 1,2. The first order conditions are given as follows:
--r= (Pi - W)--D' + Dl = 0,(4)
oP1  oP1
82 = (P2 - w) D2+D =0.
8P2 8P
Solving gives the final stage equilibrium retail prices P* = (Pi(w), Pj(w)). 25 We assume that retail
prices are increasing in w. It suffices that reaction functions be upward sloping.
111.1 Common wholesale price, no fixed fee.
Consider first the strictest interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act, i.e., that the manufacturer
must charge a common wholesale price and cannot specify a fixed fee. Given the equilibrium retail
prices derived above, the manufacturer's problem is to choose w to maximize
Ianf = (w - c) ED;(P*),
where the superscript NF is a pneumonic aid for 'no fee'. Differentiating ?NF with respect to w
gives the first order condition
2 3 2 8D dP*
D;(P*) + (w - c) -- = 0. (5)
Solving yields wNF > c. Substituting into the final stage equilibrium retail prices gives pNF -
P.(wNP) > Pf(c), for i = 1,2.
Proposition 2 When the Robinson-Patman Act requires a common wholesale price and no fixed
fee, both retail prices are strictly greater than when price diwcrimination is allowed.
Intuitively, since the manufacturer cannot extract surplus with a fixed fee, it has no alternative
than to raise the wholesale price above its marginal cost. Retailers then add their own markup. In
effect, the courts mandate a 'double markup' solution with consumers as the definitive losers.
"Equilibrium retail prices are a function of the common wholesale price, which is common knowledge to both
retailers.
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III.2 Common wholesale price, common fixed fee.
A looser interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act is that a nonlinear pricing schedule is permitted
as long as the discounts are "functionally available" to all. In other words, in equilibrium, sales
of the two retailers must be "close enough." Assuming that Di(P*) - D 2(P*), in this subsection,
we analyze the case in which the manufacturer is allowed to charge a common wholesale price and
fixed fee. Assuming the manufacturer sells to both retailers, it will set its fixed fee to extract fully
the surplus of the less profitable retailer. Let retailer 1 be this retailer. Then, given the final stage
equilibrium retail prices, the manufacturer's problem is to choose w to maximize
2
WQF ( - c) D(P.) + 2(P. - ) p)
j=1
where the superscript CF is a pneumonic aid for 'common fee'. Differentiating rCF with respect
to w, using (4), and simplifying gives the first order condition
(w - c) s 8D' dP' + (D 2(P*) - Di(P*)) +2(Pi - w) = 0. (6)i=1 j=1 8; 8zd
Since dP2/dw > 0, 8D 5/8P2 > 0, and D(P*) - Di(P*) - 0, the left hand.side of (6) is positive
when evaluated at w = c.27 Assuming the objective function is quasi-concave in w,28 the wholesale
price is higher when discrimination is forbidden than when it is allowed. Let wCF denote the
equilibrium wholesale price. Substituting into the final stage equilibrium retail prices gives PCF -
P;*(wCF) > Pe(c), for i = 1,2.
Proposition 3 When the Robinson-Patman Act requires a common wholesale price and fized fee,
and when the two-part tariff must be functionally available to all (D2(P*) - Di(P*) 0), both
retail prices are strictly greater than when price discrimination is allowed.
2T
More formally, a sufficient condition for the left hand side of (6) to be positive, when evaluated at w = c, is
that sales of the less profitable retailer be less than sales of the more profitable retailer. For N > 2 retailers, the
generalization of the sufficient condition is that sales of the least profitable retailer be less than the average sales
across all retailers.
a"The objective is quasi-concave, e.g., under linear demand.
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Intuitively, because the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits retailers from knowingly inducing dis-
criminatory prices, the wholesale price is not bargained down to marginal cost. Instead, the manu-
facturer unilaterally sets its wholesale price above marginal cost in order to internalize downstream
competition, and thereby drive retail prices closer to their joint profit maximizing levels.2" Con-
sumers are unambiguously worse off as a result.
I.3 Common wholesale price, discriminatory fixed fees.
The last scenario we consider is not so much a new interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act as
it is a recognition of an information constraint on the ability of the courts and retailers to ascertain
price discrimination violations. One possibility is that the courts can verify wholesale prices, but
not discriminatory fixed fees, which may take the form of under-the-table payments, rebates, or
other allowances that are difficult to uncover. In this case, a disadvantaged retailer simply cannot
prove a discriminatory fixed fee violation of Robinson-Patman. Another possibility is that the
courts can verify fixed fees if called upon to do so, but the system is costly, and a retailer may not
know for sure whether it has been disadvantaged. For example, suppose retailers can only infer
discrimination when they observe "surprise" retail prices by their rivals. Any rival who receives
discriminatory terms can hide this fact by setting its retail price equal to what it would set in the
absence of any favoritism. By doing so, it avoids detection. In either case, the Robinson-Patman
Act serves only to ensure stability in retail prices, not equity in surplus extraction.
We model this situation by assuming that the manufacturer must choose a common wholesale
price, but that fixed fees are determined through secret bilateral bargaining.3e This case differs
from the previous two in that now the bargaining stage of the model matters. We proceed to
2 5
lf the two-part tariff is not required to be functionally available to all, the manufacturer has to balance its desire
to internalize downstream competition with the possibility that sales of the less profitable retailer will be hurt more at
the margin than sales of the more profitable retailer. This caveat arises because when the manufacturer is restricted
to a common fixed fee, it cannot fully extract the surplus of the more profitable retailer.3
"There is no loss of generality in assuming that the wholesale price is observable. As long as the recipient of the
discriminatory contract sets its retail price equal to what it would set in the absence of any favoritism, bargaining
over the wholesale price and bargaining over the fixed fee are equivalent.
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solve backwards. Given the final stage Bertrand equilibrium retail prices, (P{(w), P(w)), the
manufacturer and each retailer negotiate in stage two over the fixed fees. Negotiations with retailer
i yields a fixed fee that maximizes the Nash product i = (7ru -dM)"(rg)(-. Differentiating 4(;
with respect to F, gives the pair of first order conditions found in (1). Simultaneously solving the
two equations for F1 and F2 as functions of w, and then substituting them into the manufacturer's
profit yields
DF ala 2 (,= (P - c) D;) + E#;(1 - a;)ajdM,
01 + 02 - 0102
where the superscript DF is a pneumonic aid for 'discriminatory fee'.
Proceeding backwards, in the initial stage the manufacturer chooses w to maximize its profit,
knowing how its decision will subsequently affect fixed fee negotiations in stage two and retail
pricing decisions in stage three. Differentiating (7) with respect to w, using (4), and simplifying
gives the first order condition
ala (w - c)F L+ (P - w)+dP)+Z(1 - a;)ad(du) =0. (8)
Since dP'/dw > 0 and 8D;/OPj > 0, j 0 i, a sufficient condition for the left hand side of (8)
to be positive when evaluated at w = c is that the derivative of the manufacturer's disagreement
point with respect to w be nonnegative. Under our interpretation of the disagreement point as
the profit the manufacturer can expect to earn if negotiations with retailer i break down, the
derivative is zero.
3 ' Hence, assuming the objective function is quasi-concave in w, the wholesale
price will be higher when price discrimination is forbidden than when it is allowed. Let wDF
denote the equilibrium wholesale price. Substituting into the final stage equilibrium retail prices
gives PDF P(wDF) > P(c) for i = 1,2.
"'The nonnegativity of the derivative of the disagreement point with respect to w is robust to the alternative
interpretation that d,, corresponds to the profit stream that the manufacturer expects to earn from retailer j while
he is in a state of disagreement with retaileri. In this case, dM = (w-c)t4+P, = a(P,-c)D,+(w-c) [D, - D,] -
(1-a,)(w-c) [D, - Al, where b represents demand for j's product while retailer i is in a state of disagreement, D,
represents demand for i's product while retailer j is in a state of disagreement, and Pi represents retailer j's negotiated
fixed fee as a function of w. Since bD > D,, i= 1,2, it is straightforward to verify that (0dM /8w)|,-.. > 0.
Proposition 4 When the Robinson-Patman Act requires a common wholesale price but allows
discriminatory fixed fees, both retail prices are strictly greater than when price discrimination is
allowed.
Intuitively, the manufacturer commits to a uniform wholesale price knowing that it will subse-
quently negotiate a given fraction of the profits derived from each good. Thus the manufacturer
effectively chooses the wholesale price in stage one to maximize a weighted average of the profits
earned by each good. This requires raising the wholesale price above marginal cost to at least
partially internalize the externality from downstream competition. This case is similar to the com-
mon fee case in that the wholesale price is not needed for surplus extraction and can be used to
internalize downstream competition, but note that the term D 2(P*) - D,(P*) is absent from the
first order condition. Since discriminatory fixed fees are negotiated, the manufacturer does not need
to balance the possibility that raising the wholesale price might reduce sales of the less profitable
retailer by more than sales of the more profitable retailer.
An important implication of this model is that the Robinson-Patman Act has perverse effects
even when it does not affect the type of discrimination that actually emerges in equilibrium. Both
the benchmark case and the common wholesale price, discriminatory fee case yield a common
wholesale price and discriminatory fee in equilibrium (except under symmetry, in which case both
yield common fees). Nevertheless, the wholesale price is higher when a common wholesale price is
required by law than when it is derived from private bilateral negotiations. The perverse effect of
Robinson-Patman is to prevent such negotiations from driving down wholesale prices.
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IV Profit and Welfare Comparisons
"Wherever a little band of lawmakers are gathered together in the sacred name of
legislation," said one observer, "you may be sure that they are ... thinking up things
they can do to the chain stores." (J. Palamountain, 1955, 162)
We now turn to the policy implications of our model. In particular, we ask what the model
implies about how the government can proceed to achieve its objectives. The discussion below is
summarized by the flow chart in Figure 1.
The first thing to notice is that al firms (weakly) prefer some price discrimination policy over
no policy at all." Firms differ, however, in their preferences among Robinson-Patman regimes.
The common fee case, if informationally feasible, is the worst for the small retailer, since the
manufacturer commits to a fixed fee that extracts its entire surplus. Thus, if Congress intended
the Robinson-Patman Act as a means of protecting the small businessman from the chain store
"menace,"'a its choice is between the no fee case and the discriminatory fee case. If the small
retailer has little or no bargaining power, as was generally believed when Robinson-Patman was
passed, then the no fee regime serves it best. This is because the rents associated with its mark-up
in the no fee regime are not transferred to the manufacturer as they are in the other regimes. On
the other hand, if the small retailer has substantial bargaining power, the discriminatory fixed fee
regime serves it best. This is because the discriminatory fixed fee regime maximizes joint profits; if
the small retailer has enough bargaining power, its share of maximized joint profits exceeds what
it earns under the no fee regime.
aaTo see this, compare the discriminatory fixed fee case, which maximizes joint profits, to the benchmark case,
which does not. Let 11 be the joint profits of the manufacturer and both retailers. It is straightforward to show that
in any bargaining equilibrium in which fixed fees are not constrained, the manufacturer earns ,. = All + B, where
A = 002/(01 + a2 - 0102) and B = [E,(1 - o.)ods.]/(as +2 a- 0102), and retailer i earns x; = Cl + D;,
where C. = (1 - o)a,/(a1 +02 - 0102) and D; = (1 - a)(du, -dM, -eau,)/(a1 +02 - 0102). Since each firm's
profit is a afine function of joint profits under the two cases, and since the disagreement points do not depend on w,
each firm is better off at w°F > c.
asSee the American Bar Association monograph 4 on Robinson-Patman (1980), pp. 14-19.
Although protecting the manufacturer and large retailer was never a stated goal of Robinson-
Patman, it could be a secondary goal if the government values their profits or if they have political
influence. In general, the preferences of these firms over the different Robinson-Patman regimes
depends on their relative bargaining powers and the degree of substitution between retailers' prod-
ucts. However, their preferences may well conflict with that of the small retailer. For example, if
retailers are close to being symmetric, the manufacturer earns close to the maximized joint profit in
the common fee case. Retailers, however, do poorly. As another example of conflicting preferences,
if the chain store has substantial bargaining power, it prefers the discriminatory fee regime, since
that regime maximizes joint profits. But if at the same time, the small retailer has little bargaining
power, it prefers the no fee regime, etc.
Like most of the antitrust statutes, the Robinson-Patman Act proscribes actions whose effect
"may be substantially to lessen competition." If "competition" refers to a process tending to lower
price toward marginal cost, then our results imply that Robinson-Patman itself lessens competi-
tion. Unlike the firms, consumers are best served when price discrimination is allowed, for in each
Robinson-Patman regime prices are higher than in the benchmark case.
We can get an idea of how large the welfare (producer plus consumer surplus) loss from
Robinson-Patman can be in a linear demand example. Assume that aggregate net utility is
U-(1 +7)V + 7V2 + (1 +7)V2+ 7V1 i -1 q 2_ (q1 - 92)a2 Ep
1+ 2y 1+ 27 2 2 (1 + 2 7 )Li1
where 1, V2, and y are nonnegative constants and qi is the quantity consumed of the ith good.
Differentiating with respect to quantity and inverting gives the demand system
Di(p,, p2) = (V - (1 +7)Pi +7P), i =1,2, j f i.
The parameter y represents the degree of substitution between products. For a unit increase in
P;, retailer i loses 1 + 7 in sales, and of this, y sales are diverted to retailer j. Thus 7/(1 + 7)
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represents the increase in j's sales as a fraction of the reduction in i's sales. When 7 = 0, no sales
are diverted; consumer demands are independent. As 7 -+ oo, retailers become perfect substitutes
in the eyes of consumers. Differences between the market size parameters V1 and V2 reflect the
degree of asymmetry.
Figure 2 illustrates the percentage decrease in total welfare arising from the three Robinson-
Patman regimes when V1 = 9, V2 = 10, and c = 0. Notice that as the retailers' products become
closer substitutes (7 increasing), the welfare loss under the discriminatory and common fee cases
increases, while the welfare loss decreases in the no fee case. At 7 = 0, the welfare loss is 0%, 3.6%,
and 41.5% respectively. At 7 = 5, the welfare loss is 23.4%, 23.7%, and 31.2%. Intuitively, the
discriminatory and common fee cases yield similar welfare results because the retailers are close
to symmetric in the example. Nevertheless, the discriminatory fee case is always preferable to the
common fee case and yields zero welfare loss at the polar extreme where the retailer's products are
independent (7 = 0). By contrast, the double markup in the no fee case is exacerbated as retailers'
products become less substitutable (7 decreasing). On the other hand, as retailers' products become
more substitutable (y increasing), all three cases converge in the limit to maximize joint profit (not
shown). But the welfare loss associated with joint profit maximization (25%) is still substantial
when compared to the competitive benchmark.
V Conclusion
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936 to limit the purchasing power of large retail chain
stores. Few have questioned its basic intent. Instead, most criticism deals with primary line issues of
predatory pricing, barriers to entry, and cartel stability, as well as practical difficulties in enforcing
the Act, such as the lack of an adequate cost justification defense (often deemed illusory), and the
inevitable impediments to distributional efficiency engendered by preventing retailers integrated
into wholesaling from being compensated by the manufacturer for their services.?
So substantial was the early criticism that gradually a broad consensus emerged that interme-
diate goods price discrimination should not be proscribed. Reflecting this view, public enforcement
was "slowly anesthetized" through the 1970's (Dixon, 1975).s But Robinson-Patman is no longer
dormant. Encouraged by the courts' increasing sensitivity to economic analysis, the Federal Trade
Commission's approach is now characterized as one of "cautious commitment."as Moreover, the
Robinson-Patman Act's visibility was recently enhanced by the Supreme Court cases Texaco, Inc.
v. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535 (1990) and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 113 U.S. 2578 (1993).ar In addition, private litigation continues unabated, (it has been
estimated by Salop and White (1988) that 18.1 percent of all private federal antitrust suits filed
between 1973 and 1983 involved Robinson-Patman claims), and the prospect of treble damages still
causes manufacturers to assess carefully the consequences of their pricing decisions.
Despite the historical and renewed importance of secondary line protection under Robinson-
Patman, the welfare effects of forbidding discriminatory discounts have only recently begun to be
the subject of formal economic modeling. However, this literature does not incorporate bargaining
or nonlinear pricing, two practices that are pervasive in many intermediate goods markets. When
they are included, the analysis of secondary line price discrimination is altered in a crucial way. For
"See Schwartz (1986) for an excellent summary of these issues.
"According to Scherer (1990), Federal Trade Commission complaints fell from an average of 74 per year during
1960-1965 to 5.6 per year during 1966-1970. And in the decade from 1975-1985, a total of only six complaints were
filed.
3
"See the April 1991 address to the Robinson-Patman Act Committee of the American Bar Association, by Kevin
Arquit, the director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition. He describes the recently settled Boise Cascade Corp.
litigation (Dkt 91-33) as well as several ongoing internal investigations. The text of his remarks can be found in the
CCH Trade Regulation Reports at 750,058.
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1n Texaco, the Supreme Court affirmed the propriety of functional discounts. It held that discounts are allowable
even though not explicitly permitted by the Robinson-Patman Act aslong as the price differentials are reimbursement
for legitimate marketing functions. The Court further indicated that suppliers do not have to satisfy the rigors of
the cost justification defense in order to show the reasonableness of the discount. The Brooke case was discussed in
footnote 1.
'"Recent articles include DeGraba (1987) and (1990) in addition to Katz (1987). In contrast to our paper, each
tends to find that secondary line price discrimination is welfare reducing. Price discrimination is harmful in DeGraba
(1987) because it induces local firms to overly differentiate its product. It is harmful in DeGraba (1990) because
it leads retailers to distort their choice of production technology in an inefficient way. Katz (1987) finds that price
discrimination is welfare reducing unless it prevents inefficient backward integration.
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instance, our model predicts that while firms (including small retailers) may benefit from Robinson-
Patman, they always do so at the expense of consumers and total welfare. Put succinctly, forbidding
intermediate goods price discrimination constrains the bargaining process by inhibiting buyers from
seeking marginal price concessions that lower retail prices. This insight, along with the numerous
primary line criticisms pointed out by others, and the practical difficulties of enforcement, raise
serious concerns about the efficacy of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Equation 2 gives the necessary first order conditions for wholesale prices
to arise in a bargaining equilibrium. Substituting in each retailer's first condition for optimal retail
pricing gives
2 GDF(wj- c)0= 0, := 1,2.
In matrix notation, this expression can be written as (w - c)D, = 0, where w = (wl, Uw), c = (c,c)
and D, is the 2-by-2 matrix of demand derivatives. By our assumptions on demand, D, is in-
vertible. Hence, the bargaining equilibrium wholesale prices are the same for each retailer and are
given by w = c. That is wholesale prices are equal to the manufacturer's marginal cost. Q.E.D.
Calculations for the Linear Demand Example:
For the linear demand example introduced in Section IV, tedious but straightforward calculations
yield the following retail prices as bargaining equilibria in the four regimes:
_ 2(1+7)y+7i+(2+5+32), =12 j#i,
PB ~~4 +8-1+ 37y2'l=199





4 '28 + 12Y
pDF_(4+37)+37V+(4 7), =1,2, j#.
8 + 127
To generate Figure 2, we used these prices to find equilibrium quantities and then substituted
them into the social welfare function (utility plus joint profits). Finally, we constructed percentage
change in welfare for each regime using the benchmark case as the base.
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Figure 2: Welfare Loss Under Robinson-Patman
V1 = 9, V2 =10, C = 0
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